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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to identify the class of strategy-proof social choice functions
on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. The characterization of this
class allows us to design social choice functions that are strategy-proof in cases in which
there are feasibility constraints; i.e., when the set of possible alternatives is not convex.
Although we think that the restriction to the domain of symmetric single-peaked prefer-
ences is interesting in its own right, the ability of designing strategy-proof social choice
functions under feasibility constraints is certainly relevant in many applications.
Consider a society with n agents who have to collectively choose one alternative from
a given set of social alternatives. Assume that this set is endowed with a natural strict
order because alternatives have a common characteristic that makes the comparison
between pairs of alternatives meaningful and objective. For instance, the set of alterna-
tives may consist of physical locations (a public facility on a road or street), properties
of a political project in terms of its left-right characteristics, the expenditure level on a
public good, indexes reecting the quality of a product, feasible temperatures in a room,
and so on.1 In all these cases, and in many others, this linear order structure permits to
identify the set of alternatives with a subset of the real line. Agents have (potentially
di¤erent) preferences on the set of alternatives. Black (1948) is the rst to suggest that,
given the linear order on the set of alternatives, agentspreferences ought to be single-
peaked. The preference of an agent is single-peaked if there exists an alternative (called
the top) which is strictly preferred to any other alternative and on each side of the top
the preference is strictly monotonic, increasing on its left and decreasing on its right.2
Society would like to select an alternative according to agents preferences. But
since they constitute private information, agents have to be asked about them. A social
choice function on a domain of preferences requires each agent to report a preference
and associates an alternative with the reported preference prole. Hence, a social choice
function on a Cartesian product domain induces an (ordinal) direct revelation game
where each agents set of strategies is his set of possible preferences. A social choice
1There is an extensive literature studying collective choice problems where the set of social alter-
natives is a linearly ordered set. See Moulin (1980), for instance. This class of problems also plays a
fundamental role in Sprumont (1995) and Barberà (2001), two excellent surveys on strategy-proofness.
2The set of single-peaked preferences is extremely large and rich; for instance, for each alternative
there are many single-peaked preferences that have as top this alternative. Moreover, no a priori
restriction is imposed on how pairs of alternatives lying in di¤erent sides of the top are ordered. Ballester
and Haeringer (2007) identify two properties that are both necessary and su¢ cient to characterize the
domain of single-peaked preference proles.
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function is strategy-proof if no agent has never incentives to strategically misrepresent
his preference; in other words, truth-telling is a (weakly) dominant strategy in the direct
revelation game induced by the social choice function.
Moulin (1980) characterizes the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice
functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences as the set of generalized median
voter schemes.3 A generalized median voter scheme is, in general, a non-anonymous
extension of the median voter. It can be interpreted as a particular way of distributing
the power to inuence the social outcome among all coalitions of agents. In addition,
Moulin (1980) also identies the two nested subclasses of strategy-proof, tops-only and
anonymous social choice functions, and strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and e¢ -
cient social choice functions.4 All the functions in these characterizations have convex
range meaning that the set of implementable alternatives is convex. This implies that
if some alternatives were banned or infeasible, either the social choice function would
have to request from the agents more information than just their top, or there would be
a single-peaked preference prole for which truthtelling is strictly dominated by some
agent.
In many applications however, the domain of preferences can be restricted even
further because the linear order structure of the set of alternatives conveys to agents
preferences more than just an ordinal content. Often, an agents preference on the set
of alternatives is responsive also to the notion of distance, embedding to the preference
its corresponding property of symmetry. A single-peaked preference is symmetric if the
following additional condition holds: an alternative is strictly preferred to another one
if and only if the former is strictly closer to the top. If an indi¤erence class contains
two alternatives then both are located in opposite sides of the top and are at the same
distance of the top.
To restrict further the domain of a social choice function is equivalent to shrink the
set of agents strategies in its induced direct revelation game. Thus, strategies that
were dominant remain dominant while strategies that were not dominant in the larger
domain may become dominant after the domain reduction. Therefore, two important
facts hold. First, any strategy-proof social choice function on a domain remains strategy-
proof on all of its subdomains. Second, a manipulable social choice function on a domain
3A social choice function is tops-only if the chosen alternative only depends on the prole of tops.
Tops-only social choice functions are especially simple in terms of the amount of information they
require about individual preferences.
4A social choice function is anonymous if it is independent of the identities of the agents; it is e¢ cient
if it always selects a Pareto optimal alternative.
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may become strategy-proof in a smaller subdomain.5 Hence, we ask whether the set
of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked
preferences, identied by Moulin (1980) as the class of generalized median voter schemes,
becomes larger when the domain of preferences where we want the social choice functions
to operate is the subdomain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. We answer this
question a¢ rmatively by completely identifying the larger class of functions that emerge
after restricting further the domain.
The new class of social choice functions can be described as generalized median
voter schemes disturbed by discontinuity jumps. A social choice function f in the class
coincides with a generalized median voter scheme except that at some (countable number
of) discontinuity jumps (for instance, an interval (a; b) with middle point d), instead of
taking the value prescribed by the generalized median voter scheme, f takes the constant
value a at [a; d); either the value a or b at d, and the constant value b at (d; b]. Our
description of the class makes precise that the choice of either a or b at any of those
proles where the generalized median voter scheme would choose d must be monotonic
in order to preserve strategy-proofness of the social choice function.
We want to stress the importance for applications of admitting discontinuous social
choice functions that are non-onto because they have a disconnected range. Non-onto
social choice functions are indispensable for the design of social choice functions that
require that some subsets of alternatives are never chosen due to feasibility constraints.
For instance when the range of the function has to be nite, or not all locations for a
public facility are possible, or the set of indexes reecting the quality of a product must
be disconnected, or the thermostat controlling for the temperature in a room can not
take all values, and so on. In all these cases, and in many others, discontinuities can not
be regarded as pathological features of social choice functions but rather as indispensable
requirements to deal with constraints on the set of feasible alternatives to be chosen.6
There is a large literature studying strategy-proofness on domains related to single-
peakedness. Our result and its proof are closely related to the following papers. Theorem
5Observe that this is just a possibility. For instance, for the case where the set of social alternatives
is the family of all subsets of a given set of candidates Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) show
that voting by committees is the class of strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on both, the
domain of separable preferences as well as on the subdomain of additive preferences, although the set
of additive preferences is strictly smaller than the set of separable preferences. No new strategy-proof
social choice function appears after the domain reduction in this case.
6Barberà, Massó, and Neme (1997 and 2005) and Barberà, Massó, and Serizawa (1998) identify sub-
classes of strategy-proof social choice functions that are able to deal with constrained sets of alternatives
in di¤erent environments.
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1 partly retains the structure of Moulin (1980)s characterization of strategy-proof and
tops-only social choice functions under the single-peaked domain of preferences. Our
result in Theorem 1 says that social choice functions that are strategy-proof on the
symmetric single-peaked domain but they were manipulable in the larger single-peaked
domain consists of generalized median voter schemes that are perturbed by specic dis-
continuities. Our result is also related to Theorem 3 in Barberà and Jackson (1994)
characterizing all strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked
preferences. Their characterization includes social choice functions whose range is not
convex; however, the characterization is open because it relays on a family of strategy-
proof tie-breaking rules (used to select between the two extremes of the discontinuity
jumps). Our characterization is closed because it explicitly describes the exact family
of admissible tie-breaking rules needed to preserve strategy-proofness. Yet, we are able
to provide this closed description because our domain contains only symmetric prefer-
ences. The proof of our result relays at some point on Berga and Serizawa (2000)s
characterization of all strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on a minimally
rich domain as the class of generalized median voter schemes;7 we use their result in the
easier case when the given strategy-proof social choice function is continuous. In addi-
tion, our proof is substantially simpler than it would have been if we were not able to use
Barberà, Berga, and Moreno (2009) result identifying conditions of preference domains
under which (individual) strategy-proofness is equivalent to group strategy-proofness.
Their result allows us to avoid many steps of individual changes of preferences by in-
stead moving simultaneously the preferences of all members of a given coalition.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the preliminary nota-
tion and the most basic denitions. In Section 3 we state some preliminary results
and give the main denitions and intuitions in order to understand why and how the
class of generalized median voter schemes has to be enlarged in order to identify the
full class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-
peaked preferences. In Section 4 we state and prove our main result characterizing
the complete class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmet-
ric single-peaked preferences (Theorem 1). After presenting some preliminaries of the
proof in Subsection 4.2, we prove Theorem 1 in Subsection 4.3. In Section 5 we rst
state as corollaries of Theorem 1 the corresponding characterizations under strategy-
7A domain is minimally rich if (i) it is a subset of the single-peaked domain, (ii) for each alternative
x there is a preference relation in the domain with top at x, and (iii) for any pair of alternatives x and
y (x 6= y) there is a preference in the domain that strictly orders x and y and whose top lies between x
and y. Obviously, the set of symmetric single-peaked preferences is a minimally rich domain.
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proofness and anonymity (Corollary 1) and under strategy-proofness, anonymity and
e¢ ciency (Corollary 2). We then argue about the importance for applications of al-
lowing for non-onto social choice functions which were ruled out by the combination of
strategy-proofness and tops-onlyness in Moulin (1980)s characterization under single-
peaked preferences and state Corollary 3 characterizing all strategy-proof social choice
functions that are e¢ cient relative to a given closed set of feasible alternatives. We
nish with the remark that, as the consequence of the main result in Barberà, Berga,
and Moreno (2009), the four statements hold if we replace in them strategy-proofness
by group strategy-proofness.
2 Preliminary notation and denitions
Let N = f1; :::; ng be the set of agents of a society that has to choose an alternative
x from the interval [0; 1].8 The preference of each agent i 2 N on the set of alterna-
tives [0; 1] is a complete, reexive, and transitive binary relation (a complete preorder)
Ri on [0; 1]. Let R be the set of complete preorders on [0; 1]. A preference prole
R = (R1; :::; Rn) 2 RN is a n-tuple of preferences. To emphasize the role of agent i or
subset of agents T , a preference prole R will be represented by (Ri; R i) or (RT ; R T ),
respectively. As usual, let Pi and Ii denote the strict and indi¤erence preference rela-
tions induced by Ri, respectively. Given Ri 2 R, the top of Ri (if any) is the unique
alternative t(Ri) that is strictly preferred to any other alternative; i.e., t(Ri)Pix for all
x 2 [0; 1]nft(Ri)g.
Given a subset of preferences S  R, a social choice function f on S is a function
f : SN ! [0; 1] selecting an alternative for each preference prole in SN . We will refer to
this Cartesian product set SN (or to the set S itself) as a domain of preferences. Given a
social choice function f : SN ! [0; 1], denote its range by rf ; i.e., rf = fx 2 [0; 1] jthere
exists R 2 SN such that f(R) = xg.
We will be interested in social choice functions that induce truth-telling as a (weakly)
dominant strategy in their associated (ordinal) direct revelation game.
Denition 1 A social choice function f : SN ! [0; 1] is strategy-proof if for all
R 2 SN , all i 2 N , and all R0i 2 S,
f(Ri; R i)Rif(R0i; R i):
8Our results also hold for any linearly ordered metric space of alternatives. In particular, for any set
of alternatives which is a closed interval of real numbers (as well as for the set R [ f 1;+1g).
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If f(R0i; R i)Pif(R) we say that i manipulates f at R via R
0
i. A social choice function
f : SN ! [0; 1] is group strategy-proof if for all R 2 SN , all T  N , all R0T 2 ST , and
all i 2 T;
f(RT ; R T )Rif(R0T ; R T ):
If f(R0T ; R T )Pif(R) for all i 2 T we say that T manipulates f at R via R0T .
We will also consider other properties of social choice functions. A social choice
function f : SN ! [0; 1] is anonymous if it is invariant with respect to the agents
names; namely, for all one-to-one mappings  : N ! N and all R 2 SN , f(R1; :::; Rn) =
f(R(1); :::; R(n)). A social choice function f : SN ! [0; 1] is dictatorial if there exists
i 2 N such that for all R 2 SN , f(R)Rix for all x 2 rf . A social choice function
f : SN ! [0; 1] is e¢ cient if for all R 2 SN , there is no z 2 [0; 1] such that, for all
i 2 N , zRif(R) and zPjf(R) for some j 2 N . A social choice function f : SN ! [0; 1]
is unanimous if for all R 2 SN such that t(Ri) = x for all i 2 N , f(R) = x. A social
choice function f : SN ! [0; 1] is onto if for all x 2 [0; 1] there is R 2 SN such that
f(R) = x (i.e., rf = [0; 1]). A social choice function f : SN ! [0; 1] is tops-only if for
all R;R0 2 SN such that t(Ri) = t(R0i) for all i 2 N , f(R) = f(R0). Let bS  R be
any subset of preferences with the property that for each x 2 [0; 1] there exists at least
a preference Ri 2 bS such that t(Ri) = x: Then, bSN is called a rich domain (note that
all minimally rich domains are rich) and with some abuse of notation, given a tops-only
social choice function f : bSN ! [0; 1] we will refer to it by its corresponding voting
scheme f : [0; 1]N ! [0; 1].
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem states that a social choice function f : RN !
[0; 1], with #rf 6= 2, is strategy-proof if and only if it is dictatorial.9 An implicit as-
sumption of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem is that the domain of the social choice
function is universal: the social choice function operates on all preference proles, be-
cause all of them are reasonable. However, for many applications, a linear order structure
on the set of alternatives naturally induces a domain restriction in which there always
exists a top, and at each of the sides of the top the preference is strictly monotonic.
Denition 2 A preference Ri 2 R is single-peaked if:
9See Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975). Of course, the social choice function f that consists
of preselecting two di¤erent alternatives x; y 2 [0; 1] and deciding between them by majority voting
(i.e., for all R 2 RN , f(R) = x if and only if #fi 2 N j xRiyg  #fi 2 N j yPixg) is strategy-proof
but not dictatorial. Observe that the range of f is equal to two. Constant social choice functions (with
only one alternative in the range) are also covered by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem because they
are trivially strategy-proof and dictatorial (note that our notion of dictator is relative to the range of
the social choice function).
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(1) there exists the top t(Ri) of Ri, and
(2) for all x; y 2 [0; 1] such that y < x  t(Ri) or t(Ri)  x < y, xPiy.
Let SP be the set of single-peaked preferences on [0; 1]. Observe that, given a single-
peaked preference Ri 2 SP, yPix may hold even if jt(Ri)  xj < jt(Ri)  yj; but then, x
and y are necessarily located in di¤erent sides of the top t(Ri). Often, the linear order
structure of the set of alternatives and a distance conveys to the preference a symmetric
property around the top (coming for instance, from a location interpretation of the set
of alternatives) that naturally induces the restriction that preferences respond to the
distance as follows.
Denition 3 A preference Ri 2 R is symmetric single-peaked if:
(1) there exists the top t(Ri) of Ri, and
(2) for all x; y 2 [0; 1], xPiy if and only if jt(Ri)  xj < jt(Ri)  yj.
Obviously, a symmetric single-peaked preference is single-peaked. Let SSP be the set
of symmetric single-peaked preferences on [0; 1]. Given any alternative x 2 [0; 1], there
is a unique symmetric single-peaked preference Ri with its top t(Ri) = x (SSP is a rich
domain). Hence, there is a one-to-one mapping between the set of symmetric single-
peaked preferences SSP and the set of alternatives [0; 1]. Thus, we will use ti 2 [0; 1]
to identify the (unique) Ri 2 SSP such that t(Ri) = ti and t = (t1; :::; tn) to denote
the corresponding symmetric single-peaked preference prole R = (R1; :::; Rn) such that
t(Ri) = ti for all i 2 N . Note that, by this one-to-one identication, any social choice
function f : SSPN ! [0; 1] is tops-only. Observe that SSPN is also a minimally rich
domain. Thus, we will also denote a social choice function f : SSPN ! [0; 1] by its
corresponding voting scheme f : [0; 1]N ! [0; 1].
3 Preliminary results and main intuition
3.1 Preliminary results
Moulin (1980) characterizes the family of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice func-
tions on the domain of single-peaked preferences as well as its anonymous subfamily.10
The two characterizations are useful to develop helpful intuitions to understand our
10Moulin (1980) also characterizes the subfamily of strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and e¢ cient
social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences. See Corollary 2 in Section 5 for the
characterization of the same class of social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked
preferences.
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characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions (and its anonymous subfamily)
on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. To state them, we need to dene
the median of an odd set of numbers. Given a set of odd real numbers fx1; :::; xKg, dene
its median as medfx1; :::; xKg = y, where y is such that #f1  k  K j xk  yg  K2
and #f1  k  K j xk  yg  K2 : Observe that since K is odd the median belongs to
the set fx1; :::; xKg and it is unique.
Proposition 1 (Moulin, 1980) A social choice function f : SPN ! [0; 1] is strategy-
proof, tops-only and anonymous if and only if there exist n + 1 xed ballots 0  pn 
:::  p0  0 such that for all R 2 SPN ,
f(R) = medft(R1); :::; t(Rn); pn; :::; p0g:
Proposition 2 (Moulin, 1980) A social choice function f : SPN ! [0; 1] is strategy-
proof and tops-only if and only if there exists a monotonic family fpSgS22N of xed
ballots, with pS 2 [0; 1] for all S 2 2N and pQ  pT if T  Q, such that for all
R 2 SPN ,
f(R) = min
S22N
max
i2S
ft(Ri); pSg:
The social choice functions identied in Propositions 1 and 2 are called median voter
schemes and generalized median voter schemes, respectively. A simple way of interpret-
ing them is as follows. Each generalized median voting scheme (and its associated family
of monotonic xed ballots) can be understood as a particular way of distributing the
power among coalitions to inuence the social choice. To see that, take an arbitrary
coalition S and its xed ballot pS. Then, coalition S can make sure that, by all of
its members reporting a top alternative below pS, the social choice will be at most pS,
independently of the reported top alternatives of the members of the complementary
coalition.11 An alternative way of describing this distribution of power among coalitions
is as follows. Fix a family of monotonic xed ballots fpSgS22N (i.e., a generalized median
voter scheme) and take a vector of tops (t(R1); :::; t(Rn)): Start at the left extreme of
the interval and push the outcome to the right until it reaches an alternative x for which
the following two things happen simultaneously: (i) there exists a coalition of agents
S such that all its members have reported a top alternative below or equal to x (i.e.,
t(Ri)  x for all i 2 S) and (ii) the xed ballot pS associated to S is located also below x
(i.e., pS  x). Median voter schemes are the anonymous subclass of generalized median
11See Barberà, Massó, and Neme (1997) for a similar interpretation for the case of a nite number of
ordered alternatives.
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voter schemes. Hence, the xed ballots of any two coalitions with the same cardinality
of any anonymous generalized median voter scheme are equal. From a monotonic family
of xed ballots fpSgS22N associated to an anonymous generalized median voter scheme
f we can identify the n+1 ballots pn  pn 1  :::  p0 needed to describe f as a median
voter scheme as follows: for each 0  s  n, ps = pS for all S 2 2N such that #S = s.
Moulin (1980) also shows that the class of group strategy-proof and tops-only social
choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences coincides with the set of
generalized median voter schemes. From the main result in Barberà, Berga, and Moreno
(2009) we can conclude that any strategy-proof social choice function on the domain of
symmetric single-peaked preferences is group strategy-proof as well. Since we will later
use this fact we state it here as a remark.12
Remark 1 (Barberà, Berga, and Moreno, 2009) Let f : SSPN ! [0; 1] be a strategy-
proof social choice function. Then, f : SSPN ! [0; 1] is group strategy-proof.
To see that in the statements of Propositions 1 and 2 tops-onlyness does not follow
from strategy-proofness consider the social choice function f : SPN ! [0; 1] where for
all R 2 SPN ,
f(R) =
(
0 if #fi 2 N j 0Ri1g  #fi 2 N j 1Pi0g
1 otherwise.
(1)
Notice that f is strategy-proof and anonymous but it is not tops-only. It also violates
e¢ ciency, unanimity, and ontoness. In the last section of the paper we will describe how
our characterization includes this class of rules on the domain of symmetric single-peaked
preferences.
3.2 Main intuition and denitions
Consider Propositions 1 and 2 for the simplest case where n = 1.13 Figure 1 depicts the
voting scheme f : [0; 1]! [0; 1] of a strategy-proof and tops-only social choice function
12Barberà, Berga and Moreno (2009) gives su¢ cient conditions dening domains of preferences under
which strategy-proofness is equivalent to group strategy-proofness. The domain of symmetric single-
peaked preferences satises these su¢ cient conditions.
13When n = 1 anonymity does not have any bite. Indeed, we can uniquely identify the two xed
ballots of the propositions as p1 = pf1g and p0 = p;.
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Figure 1
f : SP ! [0; 1] with the two associated xed ballots 0 < p1 < p0 < 1. Observe
that for any pair of xed ballots 0  p1  p0  1 the corresponding voting scheme
f : [0; 1]  ! [0; 1] is always increasing and continuous, and rf = [p1; p0]. By Proposition
2 the following remark holds.
Remark 2 Let f : SPN  ! [0; 1] be a strategy-proof and tops-only social choice
function. Then, its corresponding voting scheme f : [0; 1]N  ! [0; 1] is increasing and
continuous.
Let S be any generic subset of SP. A social choice function f : SN ! [0; 1] is
increasing if f(R)  f(R0) for all R;R0 2 SN such that t(Ri)  t(R0i) for all i 2 N .
Lemma 1 below states that, for any n  1, any strategy-proof social choice function
is increasing on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences (observe that tops-
only is not required explicitly since for each x 2 [0; 1] there exists a unique Ri 2 SSP
such that t(Ri) = x).
Lemma 1 Let f : SSPN ! [0; 1] be a strategy-proof social choice function. Then, f
is increasing.
Proof The statement follows from the iterated application of Claim A.
Claim A Let f : SSPN ! [0; 1] be a strategy-proof social choice function. Let t; t0 2
SSPN be such that for some i 2 N , ti < t0i and t i = t0 i. Then, f(t)  f(t0).
Proof of Claim A Assume otherwise; that is, there exist t; t0 2 SSPN and i 2 N
such that
ti < t
0
i; (2)
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t i = t0 i and f(t
0) < f(t). We distinguish among six possible cases. The rst three
cases (i) f(t0) < f(t)  ti < t0i; (ii) ti  f(t0) < f(t)  t0i; and (iii) f(t0) < ti  f(t)  t0i
contradict strategy-proofness of f since in all three i manipulates f at t0 via ti. The
two cases (iv) ti < t0i  f(t0) < f(t) and (v) ti  f(t0)  t0i  f(t) contradict strategy-
proofness of f since in all two i manipulates f at t via t0i. The remaining case is (vi)
f(t0)  ti < t0i  f(t): Since ti; t0i 2 SSP and f is strategy-proof,
f(t)  ti  ti   f(t0)
t0i   f(t0)  f(t)  t0i:
Adding up,
f(t)  ti + t0i   f(t0)  ti   f(t0) + f(t)  t0i
t0i   ti  ti   t0i
t0i  ti;
a contradiction with (2). 
We have shown that the monotonicity of strategy-proof social choice functions is
preserved when we restrict the domain of single-peaked preferences to be symmetric.
However, continuity (of its corresponding voting scheme) does not follow from strategy-
proofness and tops-onlyness in this smaller domain. Indeed, a special class of discontinu-
ities may arise. It is very easy to understand why when n = 1: First, take any  ;  2 (0; 1)
such that   minf ; 1   g and dene the social choice functions f  : SSP  ! [0; 1]
and f+ : SSP  ! [0; 1] where for each ti 2 SSP,
f (ti) =
(
    if ti  
 +  if  < ti
and
f+(ti) =
(
    if ti < 
 +  if   ti:
In Figure 2 we depict f . Both f  and f+ are strategy-proof on the domain of symmetric
single-peaked preferences. At any ti 2 SSP such that either ti >  or ti <  agent i can
not manipulate them. Let ti 2 SSP be such that ti =  : Then, (   )Ii( + ) since
(   ) and ( + ) are at the same distance  to  :
11
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t
f (t)
0
   
 + 
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b
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Figure 2
The function f  : SSP  ! [0; 1] is left-continuous while the function f+ : SSP  !
[0; 1] is right continuous. Observe that neither f  nor f+ are strategy-proof on the
domain of single-peaked preferences since, for instance, for  = 1=2,  = 1=4, and any
Ri 2 SP such that t(Ri) = 3=8 and 3=4Pi1=4 agent i manipulates f  and f+ at Ri via
any R0i such that t(R
0
i) = 7=8 since f
 (R0i) = f
+(R0i) = 3=4Pi1=4 = f
+(Ri) = f
 (Ri):
More generally, a strategy-proof social choice function f : SSP  ! [0; 1] could have
a countable number of discontinuities as long as the middle point of each discontinu-
ity jump is the discontinuity point itself; namely, for the point d 2 [0; 1] where f is
discontinuous at d,
d =
lim
x!d 
f(x) + lim
x!d+
f(x)
2
must hold, otherwise, f is not strategy-proof. Thus, discontinuity jumps have to be
symmetric around the discontinuity point.
As we will show in Section 4, the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on
the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences is the class of generalized median
voter schemes identied by Moulin (1980) plus the social choice functions obtained after
perturbing each generalized median voter scheme by admitting these very particular
kind of discontinuities. We will call them disturbed minmax. Formally,
Denition 4 Let fpSgS22N be a family of monotonic xed ballots. A collection of
intervals I = fImgm2M is a family of discontinuity jumps compatible with fpSgS22N if:
(1) M is a countable set,
(2) for all m 2M , Im = (am; bm)  [pN ; p;],
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(3) for all m;m0 2M such that m 6= m0, Im \ Im0 = ;,
(4) for all S 2 2N , pS =2
S
m2M
Im.
Given a family of discontinuity jumps I = fImgm2M we denote the middle point
of each open interval Im = (am; bm) by dm = am+bm2 and we preliminary perturb the
identity function as follows.
Denition 5 Given a family of discontinuity jumps I = fImgm2M , the corresponding
perturbation function I : [0; 1]! [0; 1] is dened as follows: for each x 2 [0; 1],
I(x) =
8>><>>:
x if x =2 S
m2M
Im
am if x 2 (am; dm]
bm if x 2 (dm; bm):
(3)
Let I be a family of discontinuity jumps compatible with the family of monotonic
xed ballots fpSgS22N . A possible perturbation of the generalized median voter scheme
associated to fpSgS22N that preserves its strategy-proofness in the symmetric single-
peaked domain is as follows: for each t = (t1; :::; tn) 2 SSPN ,
f(t1; :::; tn) = 
I(min
S22N
max
i2S
fti; pSg):
We will show that these perturbed functions (of generalized median voter schemes)
are the basis to characterize the class of all strategy-proof social choice functions on the
domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences.
Figure 3 illustrates the perturbation for the case n = 1, M = fmg and I = fIm =
(am; bm)g; i.e., f(t) = I(medft; p1; p0g).
-
6
f(t)
t
0
p1  
 
 
ram
p1 p0
b   bmp0
dmam bm 1
Figure 3
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Notice that I arbitrarily assigns the value am to the point dm. If instead I(dm) =
bm, the perturbed median voter scheme would still be strategy-proof. When n = 1,
there are just two ways of perturbing the generalized median voter scheme at each
discontinuity jump while preserving its strategy-proofness. When n > 1 the process
of assigning values to the discontinuity points in a way that maintains the strategy-
proofness is more complex.
Figure 4 illustrates the perturbation of an anonymous social choice function for the
case n = 2, M = fmg; I = fImg and 0 < p2 < am < dm < bm < p1 < p0 < 1;
i.e., f(t1; t2) = I(medft1; t2; p2; p1; p0g). The tops of the two agents are measured on
the axes and in bold-italic is represented the value of the social choice function in each
region. The bold line indicates the discontinuity points of the social choice function.
-
6
t(R1)
0
t(R2)
p2
p2
p2
p1
p1
p1
p1
 
 
 
t(R1)
t(R2)
t(R1)
t(R2)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t(R1)
t(R2)
p0
p0
p0
am
am
am
bm
bm
bm
dm
dm 1
1
Figure 4
It is easy to see that if I had assigned the value bm; instead of am; to dm the
perturbation of the generalized median voter scheme would still have remained strategy-
proof on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. But now there are more
ways of assigning values to the discontinuity points that preserve the strategy-proofness
of f . For the particular case depicted in Figure 4, the social choice function would have
remained strategy-proof and anonymous if it had assigned the value am to the points in
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the set B1 = f(t1; t2) 2 [0; 1]2 j 0  t1 < dm and t2 = dmg, as well as to the points in the
set B2 = f(t1; t2) 2 [0; 1]2 j t1 = dm and 0  t2 < dmg, whereas it had assigned bm to the
point (dm; dm). Actually, if anonymity was not required then it could also have assigned
the value am to the points in B1, and bm to the rest of points in B2 [ (dm; dm). However
assigning the value am to the point (dm; dm) and bm to the rest of points in B1 [ B2
would violate strategy-proofness because at any prole (t1; dm) with 0 < t1 < dm agent
1 could manipulate the social choice function via t01 = dm.
Intuitively, the perturbation of the generalized median voter scheme should preserve
the increasing monotonicity of the social choice function; otherwise, some agent could
manipulate it at some prole. We next formalize all these possibilities.
Consider a generalized median voter scheme with its associated family of monotone
xed ballots fpSgS22N . Let I = fImgm2M be a family of discontinuity jumps compatible
with fpSgS22N , and assume M 6= ?. Fix m 2M and dene
Dm = ft = (t1; :::; tn) 2 SSPN j min
S22N
max
i2S
fti; pSg = dmg;
namely, Dm is the set of symmetric single-peaked preference proles at which the gen-
eralized median voter scheme will select dm and thus the corresponding perturbation
function I will generate a discontinuity point. We refer to any set Dm as a disconti-
nuity set. We want to determine the shape of the discontinuity sets because, in order
to maintain strategy-proofness, we ought to preserve the increasing monotonicity of the
function. To do that we need to track the agents with tops strictly bellow, equal, and
strictly above dm:
Note that, since no xed ballot belongs to any discontinuity jump, if t 2 Dm then
there is at least one agent i 2 N such that ti = dm.
For each t 2 Dm dene the vector of extreme votes evm(t) = (evm1 (t); :::; evmn (t)) 2
f0; dm; 1gN ; where for each i 2 N ,
evmi (t) =
8><>:
0 if 0  ti < dm
dm if ti = dm
1 if dm < ti  1:
The vector evm(t) describes at the prole t the location of the top of each agent
relative to dm (0 if it is strictly below, 1 if it is strictly above, and dm if it is exactly
located at dm). Let EV (Dm) denote the set fevm 2 f0; dm; 1gN j evm = evm(t) for some
t 2 Dmg. To describe EV (Dm) in a more useful way, dene

m = fS 2 2N j pS < dmg
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as the family of subsets of N whose associated xed ballots are strictly below dm. Since
the family of xed ballots fpSgS22N is monotonic, S 2 
m and S ( T imply T 2 
m:
To describe the set EV (Dm) we may restrict our attention to the family of coalitions in

m, those that may induce the value dm at some preference prole.
Remark 3 Let m 2M . Then,
Dm = ft = (t1; :::; tn) 2 SSPN j min
S2
m
max
i2S
ftig = dmg
and
EV (Dm) = fevm 2 f0; dm; 1gN j there exists S 2 
m such that (i) evmi = dm for some
i 2 S, (ii) evmj 2 f0; dmg for all j 2 S and (iii) for all
T 2 
mnS; there exists j 2 T such that evmj 2 fdm; 1gg:
Namely, the set EV (Dm) describes all the extreme votes at which dm is chosen
by the generalized median voter scheme associated to the family of monotonic xed
ballots fpSgS22N . We call them extreme because given t 2 Dm; evm(t) reallocates
agentstops on the set f0; dm; 1g with the property that minS22N maxi2Sfti; pSg = dm =
minS22N maxi2Sfevmi (t); pSg: To know them, we have to look at the set of coalitions who
have the possibility of inducing the generalized median voter scheme to choose dm by
all of its members reporting a top at dm or below, at least one of its members reporting
a top exactly at dm, and all other coalitions with a xed ballot strictly below dm must
contain an agent reporting a top at dm or above.
We now turn to describe how strategy-proof social choice functions on the symmetric
single-peaked domain may choose between am and bm at those proles that induce a
discontinuity at dm = am+bm2 . Dene the preorder  on RN as follows: for all x; x0 2 RN ,
x  x0 , xi  x0i for all i 2 f1; :::; Ng
and, given m 2M , denote the restriction of  on the set EV (Dm) by m : Observe that
the natural preorder  on RN induces an incomplete, reexive, and transitive binary
relationm on EV (Dm) with the property that bevm m evm if and only if evm represents
a shift to the right of some of the extreme votes of bevm. Thus, m can be read as the
relation to be more rightist than.
Let Ym be a non-empty subset of EV (Dm). Denote by Xm = U(Ym) the upper
contour set of Ym (according to m) as
Xm = U(Ym) = fevm 2 EV (Dm) j bevm m evm for some bevm 2 Ymg:
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By convention, set U(?) = ?. Now, given Xm  EV (Dm) with the property that
Xm = U(Xm); dene gXm : Dm  ! fam; bmg as follows: for every t 2 Dm;
gXm(t) =
(
bm if evm(t) 2 Xm
am otherwise.
The functions gXm cover all di¤erent ways of assigning values am and bm to the
preference proles that generate a discontinuity point at dm preserving the monotonicity
of the perturbation. For each particular m 2M there are many such functions because
there are many subsets Xm  EV (Dm) with the property that Xm = U(Xm). Given
a family of discontinuity jumps I = fImgm2M we say that fXmgm2M is a family of
tie-breaking sets of M if for all m 2M , Xm  EV (Dm) and Xm = U(Xm).
4 Characterization
We are now ready to dene disturbed minimax social choice functions and state and
prove that they constitute the class of all strategy-proof social choice functions on the
domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences.
4.1 Denition and statement
Denition 6 A social choice function f : SSPN  ! [0; 1] is a disturbed minmax if
there exist:
(1) a monotonic family of xed ballots fpSgS22N ;
(2) a family of discontinuity jumps I = fImgm2M compatible with fpSgS22N ; and
(3) a family of tie-breaking sets fXmgm2M of M
such that, for all t = (t1; :::; tn) 2 SSPN ;
f(t) =
8<: 
I(min
S22N
max
i2S
fti; pSg) if min
S22N
max
i2S
fti; pSg 6= dm for all m 2M
gXm(t1; :::; tn) if min
S22N
max
i2S
fti; pSg = dm for an m 2M:
(4)
Theorem 1 A social choice function f : SSPN  ! [0; 1] is strategy-proof if and only
if it is a disturbed minmax.
Before moving to the proof of Theorem 1 consider again the social choice function
f dened in (1) but restricted to the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences,
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where for all R 2 SSPN ,
f(R) =
(
0 if #fi 2 N j 0Ri1g  #fi 2 N j 1Pi0g
1 otherwise.
Observe that for any Ri 2 SSP, 0Ri1 if and only if t(Ri)  12 : It is easy to see that
in the domain of single-peaked preferences f is strategy-proof and anonymous but it is
not tops-only. Hence, while it is excluded in Moulin (1980)characterization under the
domain of single-peaked preferences stated above as Proposition 2, it has the following
representation as a disturbed minmax under the domain of symmetric single-peaked
preferences. Its family of monotonic xed ballots is
pS =
(
0 if #S  n
2

1 if #S <

n
2

,
where

n
2

is the smallest integer larger or equal to n
2
. The family I of discontinuity jumps
compatible with the monotonic family of xed ballots contains only one discontinuity
interval Im = (am; bm) = (0; 1) with dm = 12 ; and the tie-breaking set of M = fmg is
Xm = fev 2 f0; 12 ; 1gN j #fi 2 N j evi 2 f0; 12gg <

n
2
g.
4.2 Preliminaries of the proof of Theorem 1
We start with some additional notation. Given x 2 [0; 1], S  N , and t 2 SSPN ,
dene xS  ( x; :::; x| {z }
#S times
) and tS  (tj)j2S: Thus, (xS; t S)  (y1; :::; yn), where yj = x if
j 2 S and yj = tj if j =2 S: Let f : SSPN  ! [0; 1] be a social choice function and
S  N: Dene the social choice function Sf : [0; 1] SSPNnS  ! [0; 1] as follows. For
all (x; t S) 2 [0; 1] SSPNnS;
Sf (x; t S) = f(x
S; t S):
We will denote the diagonal function associated to f by f  Nf .
Given t 2 [0; 1]N and x 2 [0; 1], dene the subset of proles of tops Ct;x as:
Ct;x = ft0 2 SSPN j x  t0i  ti for all i such that x  ti and
ti  t0i  x for all i such that ti  xg;
namely, Ct;x is the set of proles t0 with the property that the top t0i of each agent i
lies between ti and x. Given a social choice function f : SSPN  ! [0; 1], a subset
T  SSPN , and x 2 [0; 1] the notation f jT x means that for all t 2 T , f(t) = x:
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As a consequence of Remark 1 and Lemma 1 the following statements hold.
Remark 4 Let f : SSPN  ! [0; 1] be a strategy-proof social choice function. Then,
(R4.1) f is unanimous on its range rf ; namely, x 2 rf implies f(xN) = x;
(R4.2) for all S  N , Sf : [0; 1] SSPNnS  ! [0; 1] is strategy-proof; and
(R4.3) if t 2 SSPN is such that f(t) = x then, f jCt;x  x.
The two rst statements follow from group strategy-proofness (Remark 1) and the
last one from monotonicity (Lemma 1) and (R4.1).
We now state and prove the following three lemmata that will be useful in the proof
of Theorem 1. Lemma 2 says that the range of a strategy-proof social choice function
and the range of its associated diagonal function coincide and it is a closed subset of
[0; 1] (see also Zhou (1991)).
Lemma 2 Let f : SSPN  ! [0; 1] be a strategy-proof social choice function. Then,
rf = rf . Moreover, rf is closed.
Proof By denition of f , rf  rf . Take x 2 rf . Then, by (R4.1), f(xN) = x.
Thus, x 2 rf . Let fxkg ! x be such that xk 2 rf for all k  1 and assume x =2 rf .
Dene y = f(xN) 6= x and let xk be such that jxk   xj < jy   xj. By (R4.1), f(xNk ) = xk.
Thus, N manipulates f at x via xk. 
Lemmata 3 and 30 roughly say that if a strategy-proof social choice function is con-
stant and equal to x on one variable over some interval containing this constant x, but it
is not constant over the whole interval [0; 1], then there is a discontinuity at some point
z and the discontinuity leaves indi¤erent the agent with top at z (see Figures 2 and 3).
In the proof of Theorem 1, z will correspond to the middle point dm of a discontinuity
jump Im = (am; bm), where am = x and bm = 2z   x.
Lemma 3 Let f : SSPN  ! [0; 1] be a strategy-proof social choice function with the
property that there are i 2 N , x 2 [a; b)  [0; 1], and t i 2 SSPNnfig such that
(3.1) f(ti; t i) = x for all ti 2 [a; b) and
(3.2) f(1; t i) = y > x.
Then, there exists z 2 [b; x+y
2
] such that f(; t i) is discontinuous at z and
f j[a;z)ft ig  x
f j(z;2z x]ft ig  2z   x:
Proof Let i 2 N , x 2 [a; b), and t i 2 SSPNnfig be such that conditions (3.1) and
(3.2) hold for f . First note that the interval [b; x+y
2
] is not empty since b  x+y
2
. If
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b > x+y
2
then b would be closer to y than to x and for a small enough  > 0, i would
manipulate f at (b  ; t i) via 1.
Dene z = supfti 2 [0; 1] j f(ti; t i) = xg. The supremum is well dened because,
condition (3.1) holds and, by Lemma 1, f is increasing. Obviously z  b > x and,
by the monotonicity of f , limti!z  f(ti; t i) = x and f j[a;z)ft ig  x. We now prove
that limti!z+ f(ti; t i) = 2z   x. Suppose that limti!z+ f(ti; t i) < 2z   x. Then, there
exists  > 0 such that f(z + ; t i) + 2 < 2z   x and f(z   ; t i) = x. But then,
f(z + ; t i)   (z   ) < (z   )   x = (z   )   f(z   ; t i), and hence, i would
manipulate f at (z   ; t i) via z + . Similarly, if limti!z+ f(ti; t i) > 2z   x, there
exists  > 0 such that f(z + ; t i)   2 > 2z   x and f(z   ; t i) = x. But then
f(z+ ; t i)  (z+ ) > (z+ ) x = (z+ ) f(z  ; t i) and hence, i would manipulate
f at (z+ ; t i) via z  . Thus, limti!z+ f(ti; t i) = 2z x and f(; t i) is discontinuous
at z. Now by (R4.3), f j(z;2z x]ft ig  2z x. Finally, by monotonicity of f , 2z x  y,
and hence, z 2 [b; x+y
2
]: 
Lemma 30 Let f : SSPN  ! [0; 1] be a strategy-proof social choice function with the
property that there are i 2 N , x 2 (a; b]  [0; 1], and t i 2 SSPNnfig such that
(3.10) f(ti; t i) = x for all ti 2 (a; b] and
(3.20) f(0; t i) = y < x.
Then, there exists z 2 [x+y
2
; a] such that f(; t i) is discontinuous at z and
f j(z;b]ft ig  x
f j[2z x;z)ft ig  2z   x.
Proof Omitted since it is symmetric to the proof of Lemma 3. 
4.3 Proof of Theorem 1
It is easy to check that any disturbed minimax social choice function is strategy-proof
on the symmetric single-peaked domain.
Let f : SSPN  ! [0; 1] be a strategy-proof social choice function. To show that
f is a disturbed minmax we rst have to identify its associated monotonic family of
xed ballots fpSgS22N , family I = fImgm2M of discontinuity jumps compatible with
fpSgS22N , and family of tie-breaking sets fXmgm2M of M . Then, we will show that f
coincides with the disturbed minmax social choice function obtained by (4) in Denition
6, applied to all of them.
For each S 2 2N , dene its associated xed ballot by setting
pS  f(0S; 1NnS); (5)
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i.e., pS is the image of f at the prole where all agents in S have their top at 0 and all
agents not in S have their top at 1.
Consider the diagonal function f : SSP  ! [0; 1] associated to f . By (R4.2) and
Lemma 1, f is strategy-proof and increasing. Hence, it has at most a countable number
of discontinuities. Denote by fdmgm2M the discontinuity points of f , where M is a
countable set. For each m 2 M , dene am = limx!d m f (x), and bm = limx!d+m f (x).
Since f is discontinuous at dm and increasing on [0; 1], am and bm exist and am < bm.
Moreover, since f is strategy-proof, dm must be the middle point of Im  (am; bm);
i.e., dm = am+bm2 . Notice that the family of discontinuity jumps I = fImgm2M is
compatible with fpSgS22N since, by (5) and Lemma 2, for each S 2 2N , pS 2 rf = rf ,
rf \ (am; bm) = rf \ (am; bm) = ; and by the monotonicity of f and the denition of
am and bm, Im \ Im0 = ; for any m0 2Mnfmg. In fact,
rf = rf = [pN ; p?]nf
[
m2M
Img: (6)
If M is empty (i.e., f is continuos and its range is equal to [pN ; p?]), the statement
of Theorem 1 follows because f is a generalized median voter scheme dened on the
minimally rich domain SSPN (see Theorem 1 in Berga and Serizawa (2000)).14
Assume M is non-empty and x m 2 M . To identify the element Xm in the family
of tie-breaking sets of M , remember that 
m = fS 2 2N j pS < dmg and consider rst
the previously dened discontinuity set
Dm = ft = (t1; :::; tn) 2 SSPN j min
S2
m
max
i2S
ftig = dmg;
the set of proles of extreme votes that induce dm through the minmax
EV (Dm) = fevm 2 f0; dm; 1gN j there exists S 2 
m such that (i) evmi = dm for some
i 2 S, (ii) evmj 2 f0; dmg for all j 2 S and (iii) for all
T 2 
mnS; there exists j 2 T such that evmj 2 fdm; 1gg;
and its associated preorder m. Then, dene
Xm = fevm 2 EV (Dm) j f(evm) > dmg: (7)
14Observe that all results in Berga and Serizawa (2000) refer only to onto social choice functions.
More precisely, the restriction of SSP on the interval [pN ; p?] is a symmetric single-peaked domain
(on [pN ; p?]) and it is a minimally rich domain (on [pN ; p?]). Denote it by SSP j[pN ;p?] : Thus, we
can identify the notation of Berga and Serizawa (2000) for the image set Z = [; ] with our identied
interval [pN ; p?] and apply their Theorem 1 to the social choice function f : (SSP j[pN ;p?])N  !
[pN ; p?]. Finally, observe that their generalized median voter schemes (dened through a left-coalition
system) satisfy voter sovereignty and hence, rf = [pN ; p?].
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By Lemma 1, f is increasing and therefore Xm coincides with its upper contour set
relative to m; i.e., Xm = U(Xm):
So far we have identied from f the monotonic family of xed ballots fpSgS22N ,
the family I = fImgm2M of discontinuity jumps compatible with fpSgS22N (we are now
assuming that M 6= ?), and the family fXmgm2M of tie-breaking sets of M (and hence,
its corresponding family of tie-breaking functions fgXm : Dm  ! fam; bmggm2M). Given
all of them, let F be the social choice function dened by condition (4) in Denition 6.
We want to show that f = F:
Let t = (t1; :::; tn) 2 SSPN be arbitrary. To show that f(t) = F (t) dene q =
minT22N maxi2Tfti; pTg. We distinguish between the case where q =2 ft1; :::; tng and the
remaining case where q 2 ft1; :::; tng:
First assume that q = minT22N maxi2Tfti; pTg =2 ft1; :::; tng. Then, S = fi 2 N j
ti < qg satises that pS = q. To see that observe that if pS < q then maxi2Sfti; pSg < q
contradicting the denition of q. On the other hand, since q = minT22N maxi2Tfti; pTg =2
ft1; :::; tng, there exists T 2 2N , such that p T = q and tj < p T for all j 2 T . But then,
T  S and, by the monotonicity of p = fpTgT22N , pS  p T . Therefore, by the denition
of q, pS = p T = q.
By denition of S and the assumption that q =2 ft1; :::; tng, tj > pS for all j =2 S.
Then, t 2 C(0S ;1NnS);pS and, by (R4.3) and the denition of pS, f jC(0S;1NnS);pS  pS:
Therefore,
f(t) = pS: (8)
Moreover, by (6), pS =2 [m2MIm. Hence, by (4) in Denition 6 and the denition of I
in (3),
F (t) = I(min
T22N
max
i2T
fti; pTg) = min
T22N
max
i2T
fti; pTg = pS:
Thus, f(t) = F (t).
Assume now that q = minT22N maxj2Tftj; pTg = ti for some i 2 N . We distinguish
between two cases.
Case 1: f(t) = ti. Then, ti 2 rf and therefore, by (6), ti =2
S
m2M
Im. By (4) in
Denition 6 and the denition of I in (3),
F (t) = I(min
T22N
max
j2T
ftj; pTg) = I(ti) = ti:
Thus, f(t) = F (t):
Case 2: f(t)  x 6= ti. Dene S<i = fj 2 N j tj < tig; S=i = fj 2 N j tj = tig
and S>i = fj 2 N j tj > tig: We will denote Si = S<i [ S=i and Si = S>i [ S=i .
22
Because ti = minT22N maxj2Tftj; pTg, the following condition holds: ti 2 [pSi ; pS<i ]: If
ti < pSi
then, since for any coalition S ( Si it holds that ti < pSi  pS, we have a
contradiction with ti = minT22N maxj2Tftj; pTg. On the other hand, if pS<i < ti, then
maxj2S<i ftj; pS<i g < ti again contradicting ti = minT22N maxj2Tftj; pTg. We now show
that
f(tNi ) 2 [pSi ; pS<i ]: (9)
If f(tNi ) < pSi  ti then, N manipulates f at t
N
i via (0
Si ; 1S
>
i ) since f(0S

i ; 1S
>
i ) = p
Si
;
and if ti  pS<i < f(tNi ) then, N manipulates f at tNi via (0S
<
i ; 1S

i ) since f(0S
<
i ; 1S

i ) =
pS<i :
Suppose rst that ti =2 [m2Mfdmg. We prove in Claim 1 below that in this case
f(t) = f(tNi ) must hold.
Claim 1 Assume ti =2 [m2Mfdmg. Then, f(tNi ) = x.15
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Figure 5
15Along the proof of Claim 1 it will be useful to look at Figure 5 where the argument is shown in two
dimensions. On the axes, v represents a generic prole of tops whereas t is the prole of tops we are
looking at. Bold letters represent the value of the social choice function at the corresponding preference
prole whereas italic letters represent preferences, preference proles and alternatives.
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Proof of Claim 1 To obtain a contradiction, suppose f(tNi ) 6= x. By (9), either
x < f(tNi )  pS<i or pSi  f(t
N
i ) < x.
Case 2.1: x < f(tNi )  pS<i . Condition x < f(tNi ) implies x < ti since we are
assuming that x 6= ti holds and if x > ti then, N would manipulate f at tNi via t. By
(R4.3), the denition of Si and f(t) = x,

Si
f ( ; tS<i ) = x for all  2 [x; ti]:16
On the other hand, since tj < ti  pS<i for all j 2 S<i , (S

i ; tS<i ) 2 C(0S<i ;1Si );p
S<
i
for all
 2 [pS<i ; 1], and therefore by (5) and (R4.3),

Si
f ( ; t Si ) = pS
<
i
for all  2 [pS<i ; 1]:17
By Lemma 3, applied to the strategy-proof social choice functionS

i
f : [0; 1][0; 1]S
<
i  !
[0; 1], where [a; b) = [x; ti) and y = pS<i , there exists z 2 [ti;
x+p
S<
i
2
] such that S

i
f (; tS<i )
is discontinuous at z and

Si
f j[x;z)ftS<
i
g  x and S

i
f j(z;2z x]ftS<
i
g  2z   x:
Applying (R4.3) again, for all  2 (z; 2z   x] and for all t0j 2 [tj; 2z   x], for all j 2 S<i ,

Si
f ( ; t
0
S<i
) = 2z   x:18 (10)
Note that z is a discontinuity point of f as well. To see that observe that by (10),
f(wN) = 2z  x for all w 2 (z; 2z  x]. On the other hand, f(t) = x; and hence, x 2 rf
and by (R4.1), f(xN) = x. Assume that there exists w^ 2 (x; z) such that f(w^N) 6= x: By
monotonicity of f , x < f(w^N)  2z x. Then, either f(w^N) = 2z x andN manipulates
f at w^N via xN , or f(w^N) < 2z   x and for any 0 <  < z   w^, N manipulates f at
(z + )N via w^N : Thus, f(w^N) = x: Therefore, f has the property that
f (w) =
(
x if w 2 [x; z)
2z   x if w 2 (z; 2z   x]:
This means that f is discontinuous at z and hence there exists m 2 M such that
dm = z. By the hypothesis of Claim 1, ti 6= z and therefore, by the denition of z,
ti < z.
16In Figure 5 this corresponds to the horizontal line [x; ti]S

i  ftS<i g:
17In Figure 5 this corresponds to the horizontal line [pS<i ; 1]
S

i  ftS<i g:
18In Figure 5 this corresponds to the rectangle [z; 2z   x]Si  ( Q
j2S<i
[tj ; 2z   x]):
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By monotonicity of f and (10), f(tNi )  S

i
f (z + ; t
S<i
i ) = 2z   x for all su¢ ciently
small  > 0 (later on we will nd an upper bound for such s). We want to show that
the inequality is strict; i.e., f(tNi ) < 2z   x holds. Suppose f(tNi ) = 2z   x; then, since
ti < z, ti x < 2z x  ti holds and N would manipulate f at tNi via t which contradicts
strategy-proofness of f .
To sum up, we have shown that x < f(tNi ) < 2z x and lim!z+ S

i
f ( ; t
S<i
i ) = 2z x.
But then it is easy to see that for a small  > 0, Si manipulates f at ((z+ )
Si ; t
S<i
i ) via
t
Si
i . Namely, if 0 <  <
f(tNi ) x
2
, then (2z x (z+)) < f(tNi ) (z+) < 2z x (z+)
where the rst inequality follows from the fact that  < f(t
N
i ) x
2
implies 2+x  (z+ ) <
f(tNi )  (z + ) and this, in turn, implies  (2z   x  (z + )) < f(tNi )  (z + ); and the
second inequality follows from f(tNi ) < 2z   x. Therefore,f(tNi )  (z + ) < 2z   x  (z + );
which means that Si manipulates f at ((z + )
Si ; t
S<i
i ) via t
Si
i ; a contradiction. Thus,
f(tNi ) = x:
Case 2.2: p
Si
 f(tNi ) < x:
We omit its proof because it is symmetric to the previous one using Lemma 30 instead
of Lemma 3. This concludes the proof of Claim 1. 
Continuing with the main proof, we have shown that if f(t) = x 6= ti and ti =2
[m2Mfdmg then f(tNi ) = f (ti) = x 6= ti. By strategy-proofness of f , f is strategy-
proof and hence, by (R4.1), ti =2 rf . By (6), there existsm 2M such that ti 2 (am; bm).
By (R4.1), f (am) = am and f (bm) = bm. Since, by (R4.2), f is strategy-proof,
x = f (ti) =
(
am if am < ti < dm
bm if dm < ti < bm;
(11)
which coincides with the value of F (t) = I(minT22N maxj2Tftj; pTg = I(ti) = x.
Thus, F (t) = f(t):
The last case to be considered is when f(t) = x 6= ti and ti = dm for some m 2
M ; that is, when ti is a discontinuity point of f . Denote by Im = (am; bm) the
discontinuity jump corresponding to dm. Denote S=m = fj 2 N j tj = dmg, S<m =
fj 2 N j tj < dmg and S>m = fj 2 N j tj > dmg; and let  be such that 0 <  <
minj2S<m; k2S>mfdm   am; dm   tj; tk   dmg. Given this  > 0, consider the two proles
of tops t  = (tS<m ; (dm   )S
=
m ; tS>m) and t
+ = (tS<m ; (dm + )
S=m ; tS>m): By construction of
t , t+, the fact that ti = minT22N maxj2Tftj; pTg; and since pT =2 Im for all T 2 2N ,
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minT22N maxj2Tft j ; pTg = dm    and minT22N maxj2Tft+j ; pTg = dm + : Both dm   
and dm +  belong to Im and therefore they do not belong to rf . Moreover, since
Im \ Im0 = ;, neither dm   nor dm +  are discontinuity points of f : We are therefore
under the assumptions of Claim 1, which says that
f(t ) = f (dm   ) = am
f(t+) = f (dm + ) = bm;
where the second equality in both statements follow from the strategy-proofness of f :
By monotonicity, f(t )  f(t)  f(t+); which together with (6) implies that f(t) 2
fam; bmg: Thus, we have shown that if t is such that minT22N maxj2Tftj; pTg = ti = dm
for some m 2M then,
f(t) 2 fam; bmg: (12)
To show that f(t) = F (t); assume rst that t is such that evm(t) =2 Xm: By def-
inition of F; F (t) = am: Since evm(t) =2 Xm; by (7), f(0S<m ; dS
=
m
m ; 1S
>
m)  dm which
means, by (6), that f(0S
<
m ; d
S=m
m ; 1S
>
m)  am. Moreover, t0 = (0S<m ; dS
=
m
m ; 1S
>
m) is such that
minT22N maxj2Tft0j; pTg = dm and, by (12), f(0S<m ; dS
=
m
m ; 1S
>
m) = am: By (R4.3),
f(0S
<
m ; dS
=
m
m ; tS>m) = am: (13)
If S<m = ?; then (0S
<
m ; d
S=m
m ; tS>m) = t; and f(t) = am: If S
<
m 6= ? then f(t) = am or
otherwise S<m manipulates f at t via 0
S<m. Thus, we have shown that f(t) = am = F (t):
Symmetrically, we can show that if t is such that evm(t) 2 Xm then f(t) = F (t) = bm:
This nishes the proof of Theorem 1.
5 Final remarks
As direct consequences of Theorem 1, Corollaries 1, 2 and 3 below characterize three
relevant subclasses of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric
single-peaked preferences.
5.1 Anonymity and e¢ ciency
Corollaries 1 and 2 characterize two nested subclasses: the class of strategy-proof and
anonymous social choice functions (Corollary 1) and the class of strategy-proof, anony-
mous and e¢ cient social choice functions (Corollary 2).
To state Corollary 1 we rst need to translate the denitions of extreme votes and
tie-breaking sets of M to the anonymous case. Consider the family of n+1 xed ballots
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0  pn  :::  p1  p0  1 associated to a median voter scheme and let m 2 M: The
set of proles at which the median voter scheme will select dm is
eDm = ft = (t1; :::; tn) 2 SSPN j medft1; :::; tn; pn; :::; p0g = dmg:
By anonymity, we only need to track the number of agents with tops strictly bellow,
equal, and strictly above dm. Hence, for each t = (t1; :::; tn) 2 SSPN ; dene the triple
lm(t) = (lm< (t); l
m
= (t); l
m
> (t)) where:
(1) lm< (t) = #fi 2 N j ti < dmg;
(2) lm= (t) = #fi 2 N j ti = dmg; and
(3) lm> (t) = #fi 2 N j ti > dmg:
Observe that lm< (t) + l
m
= (t) + l
m
> (t) = n and since xed ballots do not belong to any
discontinuity jump, if t 2 eDm then, there is i 2 N such that ti = dm (i.e., lm= (t)  1).
Let rn = f(x; y; z) 2 f0; 1; :::; ng3 j x + y + z = n and y  1g be the set of triples with
positive integer components adding up to n and whose middle component is equal or
larger than 1 and dene L( eDm) = flm(t) 2 rn j t = (t1; :::; tn) 2 eDmg; namely, L( eDm)
describes all anonymous distributions of tops (number of tops strictly below dm, number
of tops at dm, number of tops strictly above dm) at which the median voter selects dm.
Dene the preorder e on f0; 1; :::; ng3 as follows: for all (x; y; z); (x0; y0; z0) 2 f0; 1; :::; ng3;
(x0; y0; z0)e(x; y; z), z0  z and x0  x:
Denote the restriction of the preorder e on the set L( eDm) by em and let eYm be a non-
empty subset of L( eDm). Denote by eXm = U(eYm) the upper contour set of eYm (according
to em) as the set of triples in L( eDm) such that they are more rightist than some triple
in eYm; namely,
eXm = U(eYm) = f(l<; l=; l>) 2 L( eDm) j (x; y; z)em(l<; l=; l>) for some (x; y; z) 2 eYmg:
By convention, set U(?) = ?. Given eXm  L( eDm) with the property that eXm =
U( eXm); dene g eXm : eDm  ! fam; bmg as follows: for every t 2 eDm,
g
eXm(t) =
(
bm if lm(t) 2 eXm
am otherwise.
Given a family of discontinuity jumps I = fImgm2M we say that f eXmgm2M is an anony-
mous family of tie-breaking sets of M if for allm 2M , eXm  L( eDm) and eXm = U( eXm).
Denition 7 A social choice function f : SSPN  ! [0; 1] is a disturbed median if
there exist:
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(1) a family of n+ 1 xed ballots 0  pn  :::  p1  p0  1;
(2) a family of discontinuity jumps I = fImgm2M compatible with pn; :::; p1; p0; and
(3) an anonymous family of tie-breaking sets f eXmgm2M of M
such that, for all t = (t1; :::; tn) 2 SSPN ,
f(t) =
(
I(medft1; :::; tn; pn; :::; p0g) if medft1; :::; tn; pn; :::; p0g 6= dm for all m 2M
g
eXm(t1; :::; tn) if medft1; :::; tn; pn; :::; p0g = dm for an m 2M:
Corollary 1 A social choice function f : SSPN  ! [0; 1] is strategy-proof and anony-
mous if and only if it is a disturbed median.
Corollary 2 A social choice function f : SSPN  ! [0; 1] is strategy-proof, anony-
mous, and e¢ cient if and only if it is a median voter scheme with the property that
pn = 0 and p0 = 1.
E¢ ciency requires that f respects unanimity and hence, rf = [0; 1]. Thus, (i) its
associated family of n+1 xed ballots has the property that 0 = pn  pn 1  :::  p0 = 1
and (ii) the family of discontinuity sets M is empty. Observe that since pn = 0 and
p0 = 1 they cancel each other out in the computation of the median at any prole t
and therefore, the generalized median voter scheme can also be described as the median
of the n tops and the n   1 xed ballots pn 1  :::  p1. This corresponds to Moulin
(1980)s characterization of the class of strategy-proof, anonymous and e¢ cient social
choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences. Thus, the reduction of the
domain does not generate in this case new strategy-proof, anonymous and e¢ cient social
choice functions.
5.2 Feasibility constraints
Our result has important implications for the design of strategy-proof social choice func-
tions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences under feasibility constraints.
Often, some subsets of alternatives (although conceivable) can not be chosen due to
feasibility constraints. Then, discontinuities are compulsory rather than pathological
because discontinuity jumps on the range of strategy-proof social choice functions are
necessary. Our result precisely describes their nature and how the strategy-proof social
choice function may select its value at these discontinuity points. However, if f is a
strategy-proof and discontinuous social choice function then, rf ( [0; 1] and hence, f
will not be e¢ cient; in particular, f will not respect unanimity. Social choice functions
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that are not e¢ cient but they are e¢ cient relative to the feasible set of alternatives are
specially interesting. Thus, let A ( [0; 1] be a closed set of feasible alternatives.19 A
social choice function f : SSPN  ! [0; 1] is e¢ cient relative to A if rf  A and for all
R 2 SSPN there is no z 2 A such that, for all i 2 N , zRif(R) and zPjf(R) for some
j 2 N: The following result follows from Theorem 1.
Corollary 3 Let A be a closed subset of [0; 1]. A social choice function f : SSPN  !
[0; 1] is strategy-proof and e¢ cient relative to A if and only if it is a disturbed minmax
with rf = A:
Note that the requirement rf = A imposes certain conditions on the family of xed
ballots fpSgS22N and on the discontinuity jumps. For instance pN = minfx 2 Ag,
p? = maxfx 2 Ag and pS 2 A for all S 2 2N : Moreover since A is closed the set
[pN ; p?]nA is open and therefore it can be written as a countable and disjoint union of
open intervals: [pN ; p?]nA = [m2MIm where Im is an open interval for all m 2 M and
Im \ Im0 = ? for all m;m0 2 M . This representation is unique up to permutations in
M , and in fact the requirement rf = A implies that the family of discontinuity jumps
compatible with fpSgS22N is exactly I = fImgm2M .
As an illustration of Corollary 3, suppose that the set of feasible alternatives is
A = f0g [ f0:1g [ [0:2; 0:8] [ f0:9g. In that case the only general requirements on the
xed ballots are that pN = 0; p? = 0:9 and pS has to belong to A for all S 2 2N . The
family of discontinuity jumps is given by I1 = (0; 0:1); I2 = (0:1; 0:2); and I3 = (0:8; 0:9),
and therefore the discontinuity points are d1 = 0:05, d2 = 0:15 and d3 = 0:85. To
proceed with the illustration and in order to design a particular strategy-proof and
anonymous social choice function f whose range rf be equal to A let N = f1; 2; 3g
be the set of agents and let p3 = p2 = 0 and p1 = p0 = 0:9 be the family of four xed
ballots. In this particular case the ballots cancel each other and hence, for all (t1; t2; t3) 2
SSPf1;2;3g, medft1; t2; t3; 0; 0; 0:9; 0:9g = medft1; t2; t3g. For each discontinuity point dm
the set L( eDm) consists of four triplets: L( eDm) = f(1; 2; 0); (0; 3; 0); (1; 1; 1); (0; 2; 1)g
where for example, the triplet (1; 2; 0) means that one top is strictly below dm and the
remaining two tops are exactly equal to dm. Note, that in all the four cases the median
of the tops coincides with dm, and hence all the proles of tops that are represented by
L( eDm) result in discontinuity points. Moreover, and since L( eD1) = L( eD2) = L( eD3),e1 = e2 = e3 as well. Denote it by e0 and observe that (1; 2; 0)e0(1; 1; 1)e0(0; 2; 1),
(1; 2; 0)e0(0; 3; 0)e0(0; 2; 1) and that (1; 1; 1) and (0; 3; 0) are not comparable by e0. To
assign a value to the social choice function on these discontinuity points preserving the
19Remember that, by Lemma 2, strategy-proof social choice functions have a closed range.
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monotonicity of the social choice function f we need to select for each dm a tie-breaking
set eXm such that eXm = U( eXm): Given L( eDm), there are six di¤erent ways of doing so:eXm 2 f;; f(0; 2; 1)g; f(1; 1; 1); (0; 2; 1)g; f(0; 3; 0); (0; 2; 1)g; f(1; 1; 1; ); (0; 3; 0); (0; 2; 1)g;
L( eDm)g: For instance, choose eX1 = f(1; 1; 1); (0; 2; 1)g; eX2 = f(0; 2; 1)g; and eX3 =
L( eDm). Thus, the disturbed median f that we may dene applying Denition 7 to the
family of four xed ballots 0 = p3 = p2 < p1 = p0 = 0:9, the family of discontinuity
jumps I1 = (0; 0:1); I2 = (0:1; 0:2); and I3 = (0:8; 0:9); and the anonymous family of
tie-breaking sets eX1 = f(1; 1; 1); (0; 2; 1)g; eX2 = f(0; 2; 1)g; and eX3 = L( eD3) has range
equal to A and it is e¢ cient relative to A: The disturbed median f could also be dened
as follows. For all t = (t1; t2; t3) 2 SSPf1;2;3g, and after setting y  medft1; t2; t3g;
f(t) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
0 if y < 0:05 or y = 0:05 and #fi j ti  0:05g = 3
0:1 if y = 0:05 and #fi j ti  0:05g < 3 or 0:05 < y < 0:15
or y = 0:15 and either 9j s.t. tj < 0:15 or t1 = t2 = t3 = 0:15
0:2 if y = 0:15 and #fi j ti  0:15g = 3 and 9j s.t. tj > 0:15
or 0:15 < y < 0:2
y if 0:2  y  0:8
0:8 if 0:8 < y < 0:85
0:9 if y  0:85:
The complexity of this description indicates the usefulness of Theorem 1s characteriza-
tion.
Finally, by Remark 1, the four statements above (Theorem 1 and Corollaries 1, 2
and 3) also hold after replacing strategy-proofness by group strategy-proofness.
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